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Faculty and Deans

ROLL OVER, LLEWELLYN?
Peter A. A lees*
I wrote some years ago that "[n]ot since Llewellyn's death ... has
the efficacy of drafting commercial law from the legal realists' frame of
reference been examined." 1 With the current proliferation of projects to
adjust, amend, rewrite and draft new, whole articles of the Uniform
Commercial Code, Karl Llewellyn's jurisprudential perspective has been
challenged.
Most importantly, Llewellyn knew what a statute could not do, and
he knew what a judge could and could not do with a statute. Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code is a jurisprudential statement; it's Llewellyn's assertion that commercial sales law could be liberated from "the
Law" by focusing on the natural forces inhibiting uncommercial behavior and providing a "Cardozoean" means to discern the immanent justice
in recurring trouble cases.2 Llewellyn's legal realism3 does not just vindicate the status quo, but accommodates development along consistent
lines that would not cross when the interests of powerful lobbies were
brought to bear.
Llewellyn chose sales law as his laboratory, an area of the commercial law composed of a body of commercial principles and invigorated by
transactors responsive to a commonality of interests. Codifying sales law
would be easier than codifying many other areas of the commercial law if
your design were to develop a framework that would enable the courts to
reach not just predictable results, but the better or even the best results.
So Llewellyn did, to an extent, start with a deck stacked in his favor.
The community of commercial sales transactors is substantially homogeneous. Buyers and sellers of goods share a common interest, realizing the mutual benefits of exchange, and, in more sophisticated
transactions, those more likely to litigate will be represented by sophisti• Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary.
1. Peter A. Alces, Toward a Jurisprudence of Bank-Customer Relations, 32 WAYNE L.
REv. 1279, 1298 (1986).
2. Justice Cardozo's regard for fluid legal concepts, capable of adaptation to ongoing
situations, impressed Llewellyn, who envisioned the Code as the source of law for commercial
transactions now and in the future.
3. Llewellyn believed there was no unitary school of legal realism. Each realist subscribed to a legal philosophy that was not necessarily the same as that espoused by other
realists. What distinguished the movement and provided the common ground among its adherents more than anything else was an impatience with formalism.
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cated counsel. Now that would not distinguish sales from secured transactions. Article 9 deals are regularly negotiated by counsel, and both the
creditor and debtor believe that the transaction will be mutually advantageous. Secured transactions, however, are distinguishable from sales
transactions insofar as they are typically dominated by the secured party.
The lender in one deal is generally the lender in the next. On the other
hand, the seller in one Article 2 transaction is often the buyer in the next.
Sears both buys and sells. Citicorp makes Article 9 loans; it does not (in
its normal course) borrow money on Article 9 terms.
This distinction between Articles 2 and 9 explains why Article 2
achieves a better balance between the rights of buyers and sellers than
Article 9 achieves between creditors and debtors. It also explains why
there might be more litigation concerning Article 2 than there would
Article 9. Buyers and sellers of relatively equal financial power would
bring an Article 2 action, whereas most Article 9 debtors would not have
the same wherewithal to sue an Article 9 creditor. 4
Further, the fact that buyers and sellers are interchangeable from
one deal to the next suggests that at the time Article 2 was drafted or
revised, it would be easier to reach agreement on the formulation of a
provision that favored neither buyer nor seller over the other. For example, Sears as buyer would not want to push too hard for fear of prejudicing the interests of Sears as seller.
The payments system law-governed by Articles 3 and 4-is distinct from both sales and secured transactions law because many commercial paper and bank collections transactions involve consumers, on
whom the predictable business pressures do not necessarily operate in the
way that and the extent to which they do in sales transactions. You
could also be fairly certain that even if you were to defer to financial
institution pressure and draft a rule that favored such interests at the
expense of consumers, the provision would not generate an avalanche of
litigation because consumers neither have the means nor the sophistication to bring actions premised on the loss of far less than a few hundred
dollars. 5
So Llewellyn reserved for himself the article of the UCC that provided the best setting for his, Cardozo's and Corbin's jurisprudential
perspective.
Then Llewellyn set about drafting an article that would work in the
way that he thought the statutory law should work. It has been ob4. Perhaps the proliferation of lender liability theories in the 1980s signaled borrowers'
willingness to more aggressively confront their lenders in court.
5. See Alces, supra note 1.
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served, derisively in commercial circles, that Article 9 provides the answer and that Article 2 merely restates the question. Therefore, Article 9
is superior to Article 2. It may be, however, that the genius of Article 2
is its restatement of the question in terms that invite the judge and jury to
discern the justice that inheres in the recurring contexts. Mr. Donald
Rapson, a member of the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC, formulated for me the difference between the Article 2 and Article 9 drafting
approaches in a 1986 letter:
There is clearly an intended and recognized difference between 2 and 9. Coogan and Kripke purposefully did not adopt
Llewellyn's drafting technique. It is almost axiomatic that the
best thing a commercial lawyer can do for his client is to keep
the client out of court. Article 9 takes that tack. Compared to
Article 2 which looks to the courts and other forums to decide
disputes by applying Article 2 principles, Article 9 endeavors to
prevent the disputes by anticipating the issues and furnishing
answers. By and large it has succeeded. In fact, it is primarily
when Article 9 fails to provide answers in Part 5 and instead,
simply uses the Article 2 technique of setting forth a "commercial unreasonableness" standard that it generates litigation. 6
For Rapson, then, a commercial statute that does not discourage litigation is a bad commercial statute, or at least not as good as the statute
that discourages litigation by "anticipating the issues and furnishing
answers. " 7
There are several responses to that conclusion. First, it is not clear
that Article 2 spawns more litigation than Article 9. While there may be
more sales cases in the U CC digest than there are secured transactions
cases, this does not establish the proposition that the drafting style of
Article 2 is the reason for the greater volume of sales litigation. It may
just be that there are many (hundreds of times) more sales than there are
secured transactions. Every day virtually every commercial entity in the
developed world is involved in a sales transaction. The same is not true
of secured transactions. Before we could conclude that Article 2 generates more litigation than Article 9, we would have to know what percentage of sales and secured transactions results in litigation.
Further, is it fair to conclude that Part 5 of Article 9 is the most
litigated portion of the secured transactions article simply because it
6. Letter from Donald J. Rapson, Member, Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC, to
Peter A. Alces, Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama 1-2 (Mar. 31, 1986) (on file
with author).
7. Id. at 2.
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incorporates Article 2 notions of "commercial unreasonableness"?
Maybe Part 5 is heavily litigated because of the time at which it becomes
relevant: The debtor has defaulted in its contract with the secured party
and the secured party is foreclosing on the collateral. Debtors may be
more litigious when they have little to lose and everything to gain.
Even if it were accurate that Article 2 generates more litigation than
most of Article 9, one could argue that the measure of a commercial
statute is not the volume of litigation it engenders or discourages, but the
quality of the results that courts can reach when they correctly apply the
statute's provisions. That is, wouldn't we prefer commercial law that
accommodates our getting the right answer when we do litigate over law
that discourages the very litigation that might guide us toward that answer? Certainly we could draft a statute that precluded litigation and
denied transactors access to the courts, but that would not be desirable,
even if efficacious. The answer lies in balance, a balance between rules
that provide predictable results and those that guide us toward the best
results. It would be inappropriate to conclude that commercial law that
emphasizes "the sense of the situation"-essentially factual determinations-is deficient because it is less predictable before the fact.
Article 2, in its way, anticipates the issues and furnishes the means
of obtaining the answers. Llewellyn recognized that it could not provide
the answers. To an extent, the drafters of Article 2A recognized that the
sales law model could support other commercial contexts and chose to
draft as the uniform personal property lease law a new Article 2A rather
than a new Article 9A. Certainly that choice was to an extent colored by
the desire to avoid imposing a filing requirement in the lease setting. 8
But the fact that Article 2A ~racks Article 2 so extensively supports the
conclusion that the Article 2 model is viable and is not rendered less so
by its imposition of a reasonableness analysis. In fact, the Article 2 provisions not imposed on the lease law were not discarded because of their
incorporation of reasonableness tests. They were otherwise deficient. 9 In
the one instance in which the drafters of Article 2A expressed an interest
in departing from a reasonableness inquiry, the comment explaining their
8. For the terms of the filing requirement debate, see Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.
Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 175 (1983), and Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Owner·
ship" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique ofProposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39
ALA. L. REV. 683 (1988).
9. For example, the drafters of Article 2A chose not to include a lease analogue of the
sales article "battle of the forms" provision, U.C.C. § 2-207 (1990).
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reasons for doing so establishes that they did not so much discard reasonableness as define it in terms of the lease context. 10
Similarly probative is the expansion of the good faith inquiry in revised Articles 3, 4 and 6, as well as in new Article 4A, to expressly incorporate conceptions of reasonableness. If the complaint about Llewellyn's
Article 2 were that it relies too much on conceptions of reasonableness, it
would be curious that the sponsoring organizations have not backed off
of the requirement but rather have multiplied the contexts in which it
matters.
I suspect, however, that the cause of the uneasiness with Article 2,
and Llewellyn's jurisprudential position, is not that it relies too much on
reasonableness inquiries but that it restates the question rather than provides certain answers. From the perspective of some sophisticated commercial counsel, the method of Article 2 inhibits lawyering on behalf of
clients uncomfortable with a judge's or jury's exercising judgment that
might not vindicate the economic leverage such clients could utilize if
Article 2 were not the law. It is not, then, the lack of certainty and
predictability that they find most troubling.
That conclusion is supported daily by courts that construe the most
ostensibly certain and formal aspects of the Commercial Code. There is
probably no more clear example of such a mechanical Code concept than
the Article 9 filing statement requirements. 11 If, in fact, Article 9 works
because the drafters anticipated the issues and formulated the best answers, then it is difficult to explain the Article 9 filing system. The filing
and search system is a morass, 12 and Article 9 debtors, trustees in bankruptcy and junior secured parties have little trouble finding a litigable
issue that can survive summary judgment in order to frustrate, if not
altogether defeat, the secured party. 13
The state of Article 9 filing litigation, then, intimates that the solution to the litigation problem might not rest alone in the terms of the
statutory formulation. Instead, the volume of litigation that a statute or
10. See id. § 2A-504.
11. See id. art. 9.
12. See generally Peter A. Alces & Robert M. Lloyd, An Agenda for Reform of the Article
9 Filing System, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 99 (1991) (suggesting need for changes to assure that
substance prevails over form).
13. See Letter from James J. White to Charles W. Mooney & Steven L. Harris, CoReporters, Permanent Editorial Board Article 9 Study 1-3 (Sept. 3, 1992) (on file with author)
(urging that revised Article 9 should make unperfected security interest superior to judicial
lien-claim asserted by trustee in bankruptcy-in order to avoid financing statement litigation
in bankruptcy setting). Professor White wrote: "This litigation is waste. It is wonderful for us
lawyers, but adds little or nothing of social value." I d. at 2.
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provision generates may be more a function of the transactional contexts
in which the litigable issues arise. If a particular provision comes into
play when a party to the transaction is in bankruptcy, then that provision
might be the source of more litigation than would an even more flexible,
ostensibly uncertain, formulation that is pertinent at a point in the transaction at which the parties are not necessarily any closer to bankruptcy.
It may also be that there is a greater likelihood of litigation if the
parties to a transaction are more likely to be represented by counsel and
the value in dispute is sufficient to justify the litigation expense for both
transactors. This is not to say that the sophistication and means of the
litigants bear a relation to the volume of litigation more directly than the
relationship between flexibility ("reasonableness" tests) and litigation
volume, but it does suggest that the case against Article 2, based on the
idea that the Article's focus on fact-sensitive determinations generate litigation, has not been made.
Because Article 2's preoccupation with factual determinations may
not, as some would assert, actually cripple the legislation, that still does
not provide any argument in favor of Llewellyn's style. It would barely
constitute faint praise. But Llewellyn's style in drafting Article 2 is
otherwise defensible, even laudable. The argument in its favor may
proceed from Lon Fuller's description of one perspective toward
adjudication:
We are all familiar with the process by which the judicial
reform of disfavored legislative enactments is accomplished....
The process ... requires three steps. The first of these is to
divine some single "purpose" which the statute serves. This is
done although not one statute in a hundred has any such single
purpose, and although the objectives of nearly every statute are
differently interpreted by the different classes of its sponsors.
The second step is to discover that a mythical being called "the
legislator," in pursuit of this imagined "purpose," overlooked
something or left some gap or imperfection in his work. Then
comes the final and most refreshing part of the task, which
is, of course, to fill in the blank thus created. Quod erat
faciendum.
My [fellow justice]'s penchant for finding holes in statutes
reminds one of the story told by an ancient author about the
man who ate a pair of shoes. Asked how he liked them, he
replied that the part he liked best was the holes. That is the
way my [fellow justice] feels about statutes; the more holes they
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have in them the better he likes them. In short, he doesn't like
statutes. 14
The jurisprudential perspective Fuller describes is Cardozo's perspective as described by Llewellyn. 15 But does it make sense to say that
Llewellyn would build a statute around the jurisprudential perspective of
a jurist who did not like statutes? Yes. In fact, I wonder whether Llewellyn liked statutes very much.
Article 2 has been recognized as a common-law code. The sales article represents the tortification of contract law in commercial sales contexts. The focus is on factual analyses in terms of fundamental
principles. Llewellyn concluded that it was better to define the parameters of acceptable commercial behavior and practices and empower
judges and juries, than to fix ostensibly determinate and certain rules and
then allow the courts and lawyers to contort the spirit of the law while
being true to its letter.
The focus on result in terms of the sense of the situation, something
more than common sense, would provide more predictable results than
would the provision of certain statutory terms. The irony is that the
more flexible the drafting, the more "open-ended" the statutory inquiry,
the more predictable the results that would flow from the courts' application of the statute. The provisions of Article 2 betray a coherent and
comprehensive method. It is that method that provides all the predictability that can be expected of the law.
It would be a mistake for the drafters of commercial law to give up
on Llewellyn's jurisprudential approach, to look for ways to distinguish
one commercial context from the next-such as software licensing from
sales and leases of goods and services-to disintegrate the commercial
law with new Articles 2B, 2C, ad nauseum, rather than to look for ways
to integrate commercial legislation. The challenge for the drafters of a
revised Article 2 is to identify the strategic strong points Llewellyn knew
would reveal themselves to the careful lawyer-scholar. Article 2 should
certainly be revised, if for no other reason than to bring more commercial
contracts within its scope.
But maybe we will find looking back on 1993, in twenty-five or so
years, that in their desire to follow in the footsteps of the drafters of the
original Uniform Commercial Code, the commercial lawyer-scholars of
the late twentieth century divided the Code into more and more special14. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Spe/uncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REv. 616, 634
(1949).
15. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
430-37 (1960).
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ized and discrete articles, each bearing the imprint of the particular predisposition of its drafter(s). Then, in around the year 2020, the task will
be to discern and recapture the common ground, to emphasize fundamental affinities rather than superficial bases for distinction. Maybe only
then we will see the beginning of the "neo-realist" movement.

